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Edward 'V. Aquillard:
ESTABUSHMENT CLAUSE
VIOLATED BY STATUTE
REQUIRING SCHOOL'S
BALANCED TREATMENT OF
EVOLUTION AND CREATION
SCIENCE
In Edwards

'V.

Aquillard, __U.S.__,

107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987), the Supreme Court

of the United States held the Louisiana Balanced Treatment Act facially invalid
because it violated the Establishment
Clause of the first amendment. The Court
found that the Act, as it applied to elementary and secondary public schools, sought
to employ the symbolic and financial support of government to achieve a religious
purpose.
The Plaintiffs, Louisiana teachers and
parents of public school students, challenged the constitutionality of the Act in
federal district court. The district court
granted the Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, holding that no secular purpose for the Act was present. The court of
appeals affirmed.
The Balanced Treatment Act did not
require the teaching of either evolution or
creation-science. However, it did forbid
the teaching of either without balanced
treatment of the other. The theories of
evolution and creation-science were statutorily defined as "the scientific evidences
for [creation or evolution] and inferences
for those scientific evidences." La. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 17:286.1-7 (West 1982).
The Court has applied the three prong
Lemon test in the past to determine the
constitutionality of Establishment Clause
cases. First, the law must have a secular legislative purpose. Second, the statute's primary effect must neither advance nor
inhibit religion and third, the statute must
not result in an excessive entanglement of
government with religion. Lemon 'V. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
In the instant case, because the Court
found that the Act had no secular purpose,
"no consideration of the second or third
criteria is necessary." Wallace 'V. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38,56 (1985). The purpose prong
of the Lemon test considers whether the
government's actual purpose is to endorse
or disapprove of religion. Lynch 'V. Donnel-

ly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984).
As to the determinative issue of secular
purpose, the main point of disagreement
between the majority and the dissent was
whether the Act's stated purpose of "protecting academic freedom" was sufficiently
secular (dissent) or a cover-up of a religious
preference (majority). To support their
decisions, both the majority and dissent
appealed to the statutory terms, judicial
and legislative history, and the general
history and understanding of the two theories.
In its analysis, the Court first found that
academic freedom was not advanced by
Louisiana's Balanced Treatment Act_ Conversely, the purpose was to "discredit evolution by counter-balancing its teaching at
every turn with the teaching of creationscience." Edward 'V. Aquillard, 107 S. Ct.
2573, 2580. The Act provided schoolteachers with no more authority or flexibility
than what they already possessed. The
Court also saw the Act as having a discriminatory preference for the teaching of
creation-science
because
curriculum
guides, research services, and protection
against discrimination were supplied for it
but not for evolution-science.
Opining for the dissent, Justice Scalia
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, took
issue with the Court's evaluation of "academic freedom" because it was contrary to
the terms of the statute. In their view, the
legislative history clearly showed that the
"academic freedom" was intended for the
students to be free from indoctrination,
not the teacher's freedom to teach what
they want.
The dissent approached the majority's
argument of discrimination in favor of
creation-science by focusing on the present
status of the science curriculum in public
schools. Creation-science asserted the dissent, is being discriminated, misrepresented, and censored in public schools in
favor of evolution. Id. at 2602. The Act's
purpose was to reasonably redress this discrimination by compensating for the
unavailability of texts on creation-science
for class use and allowing creationscientists to write them. Simply, the dissent argued, protection for evolutionists
from discrimination is not needed.
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Next, the Court found that the legislative and historical interpretation of
creation-science advanced a particular religious doctrine. In Epperson 'V. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97 (1968), the Court noted contemporaneous and historical antagonisms
and connections between the teachings of
certain religious denominations and the
teaching of evolution. Witnesses at the legislative hearings in the instant case testified
that a creator was responsible for the
universe and everything in it. The sponsoring senator stated that "evolution advances
religions contrary to my own." Edwards,
107 S. Ct. at 2582.
From this evidence, the majority concluded that the Act's primary purpose was
to provide an advantage to a particular religious doctrine that rejects evolution and
holds to the creation of humankind by a
divine creator. To violate the Establishment Clause the statute must either promote a particular religious doctrine, here,
the Judeo-Christian belief in creation, or
prohibit a theory deemed antagonistic to a
particular doctrine, here, evolution. See
Epperson, 393 U.S. at 106-7.
The dissent asserted that the majority
disregarded the stated purpose of the statute and determined what they believed to
have motivated the legislature. Creationscience is a term of art. Louisiana law, continued the dissent, requires it to be
interpreted according to the art or profession to which it refers. La. Civ. Code Ann.
art. 15 (West 1952). The majority had
interpreted "creation-science" according
to its historical affiliations. The dissent
believed that "creation-science" should be
defined according to the statutory definition and legislative history, and therefore,
could easily be taught without reference to
religion.
Additionally, the dissent asserted that
legislators could vote based on their religious convictions and stay within the
confines of the first amendment. To support this proposition, the dissent relied on
Harris 'V. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980),
where Sunday blue laws were upheld even
though they happened to harmonize with
the tenets of some religions.
An inconsistency in the Court's opinion
was shown by the dissent because without
the Balanced Treatment Act the Court was
violating the Establishment Clause by allowing evolution-science to be taught freely. The Court has referred to secular
humanism as a religion with evolution as
a central tenant. Torcaso 'V. Watkins, 367
U.S. 488 (1961). Therefore, the dissent
concluded, creation-science is being discriminated against and religion with evolution is being promoted. The Balanced
Treatment Act was designed to redress
that for the benefit of the students.
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Justice Powell joined by Justice O'Conner (concurring) concluded that there were
historical associations of creation-science
with the religious belief in the creation of
the universe by a divine God as described
in the Bible. These associations, according
to Justice Powell, were enough to overricj.e
the fact that the statute did not explicitly
refer to a religious purpose.
The Court did leave the door open for
religious oriented information and
creation-science to be used in public
schools; but the purpose must not advance
a particular religious belief.
Edwards v. Aquillard follows closely the
trend of Supreme Court decisions dealing
with state statutes addressing religion in
public schools. The Establishment Clause
is being relied upon in the Court's

involvement in state educational law, an
area in which the state and local governments have a large interest. In recent years
the Court has invalidated a school district's use of public school teachers in religious schools. Grand Rapids School
District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), and
the hanging of a copy of the Ten Commandments on a public school wall. Stone
v. Gragam, 449 U.S. 39 (1980). In these
two cases the Court found no secular purpose. Edwards also illustrates that in determining the presence of secular purpose the
Court will go beyond the definitions in
the statute to find the motives of the legislature. This is one reason why Justice Scalia has called for a re-evaluation of the
Lemon secular purpose test.

-David G. Banister
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Lee v. Wheeler: RECOVERY FOR
NEGUGENCEOFPHANTOM
DRIVER UNDER UNINSURED
MOTORIST PROVISIONS
On a question certified by the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held in Lee v. Wheeler, 310 Md.
233, 528 A.2d 912 (1987) that under an
automobile insurance policy covering
Maryland insureds, an uninsured motorist
provision limiting coverage to situations in
which there is physical contact between
the insureds' vehicle and the phantom
vehicle is unenforceable as against public
policy under Maryland law. This case
expanded a similar ruling in State Farm

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Maryland Auto. Ins.
Fund, 227 Md. 602, 356 A.2d 560 (1976) by
making such provisions unenforceable for
accidents happening outside, as well as
inside, the State of Maryland.
Ark and Olivia Lee were residents of
Maryland whose automobile was titled
and registered in Maryland. The original
insurance policy and all renewals were
addressed and mailed to the Lees'
Maryland residence and all premiums were
paid from the same residence. While the
Lees were operating their vehicle in the
District of Columbia, a vehicle operated
by Marlene Wheeler swerved to avoid an
unidentified (phantom) vehicle that suddenly entered her lane of traffic. In the
process, Wheeler struck the Lees' vehicle
head-on.
The Lees brought an action against
Wheeler in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia invoking diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.c.
§ 1332 (1982). The Lees also joined their
insurer, Pennsylvania General Insurance
Company (Pennsylvania General), seeking
coverage under the policy's uninsured
motorist provisions for the damages sustained as a result of the phantom's negligence.
The Lees' claim against Pennsylvania
General was dismissed because the district
judge found that the Lees' insurance policy
expressly required physical contact with
the phantom vehicle in order for the uninsured motorist coverage provisions to apply and that provision was enforceable
under District of Columbia law. The Lees
appealed from the order granting the
motion to dismiss.
The United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit found
that Maryland law applied but found no
pertinent Maryland cases to serve as a
guide in making a decision. Under Md.
Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 12-601
(1984), they certified the following ques-

34-The Law Forum/Winter, 1988 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

